Exchange rate and devaluation
Industry, commerce, as well as
employment opportunities, unexpectedly, flourished for the greater part
of Gen. Sani Abacha’s four-year reign, despite Nigeria’s pariah status
and the stupendous treasury rape by the dictator. The question,
therefore, is how Abacha’s economic team sustained the erstwhile elusive
enabling environment, despite the dysfunctional economy that they
inherited. Fortunately, Chief Anthony Ani, an insider in that team,
answered this question, in his keynote address, at ICAN’s induction
ceremony on May 11, 2016.
A summary by this columnist and excerpts
from the former finance minister’s 19-page presentation follow
hereafter. Please read on:
“We are an import dependent nation,
therefore the naira price of dollars, required to pay for imports, will
inevitably significantly impact multiple sectors of our economy.
Furthermore, despite the collapse of naira rate from $2=N1 to N199=$
since 1985, the IMF, several international banks and experts and the
United States of America and have goaded Nigeria to further devalue our
currency. Recently, even the immediate past President of ICAN also
echoed the call for naira devaluation. Conversely, I hold the view that
our naira is even undervalued and President Muhammadu Buhari should
therefore resist the pressure to devalue, as there is nothing to gain,
because devaluation will further worsen our economic situation,
especially when crude oil remains our primary export commodity.
“Invariably, exchange rate is a key
policy variable, because a viable, stable and realistic exchange rate
serves as a catalyst for critical adjustments and judicious application
of resources. Furthermore, exchange rate stability, attracts capital
inflows, and directs other foreign exchange transactions from the
parallel market and therefore augurs well for domestic price stability
and international trade”.
The naira was effectively devalued when
“Nigeria adopted the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986, with
the introduction of the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market. Since
then, we tried all sorts of auctions – Dutch, English, American etc – of
our meagre foreign exchange, but the banks, and their operators made
bonanza profits from the market until things came to a head by November,
1994. The banks were selling dollars bought at N22 SFEM price to end
users, and manufacturers at N128=$1. Meanwhile, Inflation was galloping
at 88 per cent and lending rate was oppressive at over 30 per cent.
There was serious price instability and salaries and wages were not
aligned to inflation or the parallel market exchange rate. There was
national discontent and the security of the nation was threatened.”
Consequently, in November 1994, the
acting Finance Minister (Chief Anthony Ani), CBN Governor (Paul Ogwuma)
and the Chairman of National Economic Intelligence Committee, the late
Prof Sam Aluko, were ordered to find a solution by the National Security
Council. “We, therefore, looked at the macro-economic variables and
found that there was over-liquidity of the naira in the money market, as
a result of excess profits of banks from forex arbitrage.”
“We decided to eliminate this liquidity
and reduce instability and inflation. We also resolved to crash the
parallel market by all means, but this was problematic, because, with
barely $1bn reserves and less than two weeks imports cover, we did not
have the capacity to do so, especially when overseas exporters also
demanded upfront payments”.
“Ultimately, we (Ani/Ogwuma/Aluko)
agreed that for the parallel market to crash, the CBN must fund the
needs of the real sector, while banks sourced their own forex to fund
other sectors. We also shut all other forex windows and reluctantly
concluded that, an exchange rate of N80-82=$1 would be sustainable, but
production and productivity must however remain our abiding watch
words.”
Indeed, as soon as our recommendations
were effected, the parallel market crashed from N128 to $82/$1.
Furthermore, we discovered that proceeds from non-oil exports and
remittances from Nigerians in the Diaspora were surprisingly nil. On
enquiry, we gathered that Asian businessmen, who controlled Nigeria’s
non-oil exports, persistently, falsely condemned whole shipments to be
substandard and ultimately declared valueless, whereas these exporters
actually sold and retained the proceeds abroad.”
“Similarly, the meters at flow stations
of our oil terminals malfunctioned and remained idle for years, with the
result that crude oil were shipped, for which no payments were made.
Consequently, we introduced pre-shipment inspection to further seal
these loopholes and open up significant capital inflows. We were equally
determined to reduce our heavy dependence on food and petroleum
imports, particularly.”
Furthermore, with the removal of the
existing tax on overseas remittances and the introduction of other
supportive laws such as the Nigerian Investment Promotion Act 1995,
which guaranteed long term investments in Nigeria, foreign inflows
increased, and external reserves rose to $7bn by 1997, to make the
exchange rate more stable and the Naira virtually convertible. The
Foreign Exchange (Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1995) also targeted
foreign investors and an estimated $400bn stashed away by Nigerians with
the re-introduction of domiciliary accounts.
“An important development was that the
CBN now made a profit of N58 per dollar, on forex sales to the real
sector; consequently the CBN was awash with naira which we applied to
balance our budgets and also build infrastructure such as the Gwarimpa
Housing Estate, the biggest housing estate in Africa, whereas before the
introduction of AFEM, these huge profits were selfishly cornered by
banks and bankers.”
Nevertheless, with substantial CBN profit from dollar sales, we did not need to borrow externally or internally between 1995-8!
“In February 1995, I proposed payment of
$7bn as full debt settlement, spread over five years with nil interest,
and our Paris Club creditors were very excited with this proposal.
However, in 1996, during the process of analysis and verification of the
entire Paris Club debt, we discovered 18 ‘failed projects’ valued at
$1bn, which were never executed, even though the funds had been drawn
down. The Government insisted that rather than pay, we should go to
court. Subsequently, however, the IMF wrote to the Paris Club creditors
not to deal with Ani or his agents. Sadly, we ended up paying $12bn
rather than $7bn during the debt cancellation exercise, even when our
creditors had earlier accepted 70-80 per cent discount on our debts”.
“The whole Paris Club thing was a debt
trap to enforce a Structural Adjustment Programme and they used Nigerian
economists, trained in North American universities for this
enforcement. The debt cancellation exercise of 2003 destroyed our
exchange rate mechanism, as the CBN abdicated its responsibilities as
the central player in the forex market, while Bureaux de Change
operators were inexplicably also licensed and funded by the CBN.”
Eventually, there were 3,000 BDCs owned
by bankers, legislators, politicians, all funded with $60,000 weekly.
Regrettably, with this development, few families or clans took control
of the forex market and made a kill with super profits and the rest is
history. Ultimately, the naira also became gradually compulsively
OVER-DEVALUED. Today, the same banks, with robust support from the IMF
and other financial experts are again suggesting that the naira should
further be devalued, despite the absence of any positive impact from
earlier serial devaluations.
Profits made by banks in respect of
forex transactions remain humongous and Nigeria is the only country
which frivolously re-exports its remittances, with liberal limits of
over $150,000, at a time, on forex denominated personal debit cards, in a
country where N18,000 ($80) is still the minimum wage! It is
inexplicable that, although the naira is not convertible, remittances
which are meant to stabilise our exchange rate is now re-exported with
the CBN’s facilitation. This is the cause of the scarcity of dollars in
the market and is also the cause of the worsening depreciation of the
naira in the parallel market. Naira must not be devalued and I submit
that President Buhari is right in resisting devaluation.”
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